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. INTRODUCTION 
Terms of Reference 
IDRC Project 96 -860 1, "Industrial Support Unit, Palestine" provided support to a non-governmental body, the 
Development Resource Centre, to carry out activities with the following objectives: 
General Objective 
To improve the productivity and competitiveness of SMEs in Palestine. 
Specific Objectives 
To allow DRC to set up an office in the West Bank to provide SMEs with affordable technical 
advisory and training services; 
w To assist DRC in establishing an Industrial Support Unit in the West bank which will act as a 
DRC-lead consortium of existing institutions providing SMEs with technical, management, 
market and financial services in view of enhancing their productivity, competitiveness and 
potential for employment and income generation; 
w To promote an integrated and holistic pro-active approach to service provision to SMEs in view 
of improving the effectiveness of services provided by the Unit's member institutions and 
enhancing their impacts and to substantially increase the number of SMEs benefitting from 
these services; 
w To enhance the access of the Unit's member institutions and their client SMEs to international 
information related to new technologies, raw materials, export markets, government 
regulations, quality standards, etc .... 
= To get a better understanding of the constraints and needs of Palestinian SMEs and to provide 
decision-makers with recommendations for the formulation of policies and programs in support 
of the SME sector. 
In addition to specifying these objectives, the Project Summary enumerated the following set of expected outputs from 
the project; 
To provide full feasibility studies and business plans to new investors and manufacturers 
seeking to upgrade their enterprises; 
To develop and implement training programs targeting the needs of industry on the ground and 
encouraging non-traditional work areas for women; 
To provide technical assistance packages to specific SMEs across all major sectors requiring 
help in specific areas of manufacturing and technology transfer; 
To provide environmental impact assessments and promote environmentally sound investment 
and manufacturing support; 
A series of sub-sector studies identifying constraints, needs and priorities of the main SME 
subsectors in the West Bank: 
A study on the policy, regulatory and institutional environment constraining the development 
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of SMEs in Palestine; 
A critical assessment of the existing research and development (R&D) infrastructure and 
resources for SME support and development in Palestine. 
Based on the experience of this pilot project, provide recommendations to Palestinian policy 
makers and the donor community on alternative mechanisms and institutional arrangements for 
establishing a nation-wide industrial outreach system. 
The specific terms of reference of the present evaluation are as follows: 
1 The consultant will evaluate the project (relating to the DRC Industrial Support Unit) in close 
consultation with the Unit's Director and the steering committee. The objective of the 
evaluation will be twofold. First, the evaluation will assess the effectiveness of the Unit in 
achieving its stated objectives, and carry out a preliminary assessment of the impact of the 
project on SMEs in the West Bank. Second, the evaluation will analyse the experience of the 
Pilot Project in view ofproviding recommendations to policy makers and the donor community 
on alternative mechanisms and institutional arrangements for establishing a nation-wide 
industrial outreach system in Palestine. 
2 In summary, the consultant is required to meet with DRC and ISU staff and its steering 
committee, with relevant government officials, and with representatives of 2 or 3 client firms. 
He is to provide a report which will include: 
a situation assessment of the ISU results to date; 
a discussion of "lessons learned" from ISU experiences in the light of experiences with similar 
support programs elsewhere in the world; and 
a set of recommendations to the DRC and IDRC regarding future actions, both regarding this 
specific project and longer term actions to improve the industrial outreach system in Palestine 
This brief evaluation involved an intensive series of interviews with individuals and organizations listed in Appendix 
I, carried out in Ramallah on July 8 and 9, 1999 coupled with a review of documentation provided by both IDRC and 
DRC - the documentation is listed in Appendix 11. 
During the period of field work, it became quickly evident that the evaluation needed to give full weight to the impact 
on the DRCIISU project of the particular political and economic circumstances which affect Palestine today, including 
the burden of the thirty years of Israeli Occupation and also including the present state of involvement of both the 
Palestinian National Authority and the Donor Community with private sector development. As a result, the 
evaluation has also used material collected during a preliminary analysis of Palestine's "National System of 
Innovation" carried out by Mullin Consulting Ltd for other clients during the period of July 1 I to 17. 
The Structure of the Report 
The report is presented in four major sections. 
The first section deals with the environment for small enterprise development in Palestine and touches on the 
characteristics of the firms being considered, the activities of the Palestine National Authority and of Donor Agencies 
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in support of those firms and sketches out briefly some of the service providers active in the area 
The second section deals with the first main element of the evaluation - the assessment of the performance, output 
and impact of the Industrial Support Unit operated by the DRC. This section offers also a commentary on the design 
of the project under evaluation. 
The third section turns to the broader issue raised in the evaluation - that of the steps needed to be taken in the longer 
term to create a nation-wide industrial outreach system in Palestine. 
Thefourth andJinalsection discusses some options open to IDRC in its future activities relating to SMEs in Palestine. 
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THE E W I R O ~ E N T  FOR SME DEVELOPMENT IN PALESTME 
The needs and characteristics of SMEs in Palestine 
In order to appropriately assess the work of DRC and its ISU, it is crucial to begin with an understanding of the needs 
and characteristics of the firms which ISU is attempting to help. 
Careful consideration of the overall performance of SMEs in almost all economies can lead to the conclusion that 
their most pressing and continuing needs can be summarised under five broad headings. These are the needs to obtain 
access to: 
Finance of all kinds, including finance for activities related to the promotion of technical change; 
Markets and market information; 
Improved management skills and systems, including those necessary for the management of technical change; 
Improved training for all of their employees, in particular to allow them to keep up with changing demands in 
the market place (specially for improved quality and service) and changing practices and technologies in the 
workplace; and 
Best practice technologies, where 'best practice' is defined in terms of the acquiring enterprise's capacity to 
absorb and manage the technology in question. 
This set of needs can be used to provide a 'demand-side' framework for consideration of any program of support. 
Technology diffusion or extension programs need to address, in one way or another, each of these broadly defined 
needs, and need to do so in the context of the evolving rules of international trade as established by the World Trade 
Organisation. 
Recent work in a Latin American country' categorised the predominant attitudes and approaches of SMEs in terms 
which are probably generally applicable in many countries. The attitudes were: 
Lack of tradition in developing and/or continuously improving products and processes 
Lack of understanding of management needs, especially relating to the management of technical change 
Chronic shortage of funding (long-term financing and short-term cash flow) 
Lack of ability to cope with the impact of the opening up of the domestic market to freer forms of trade 
Lack of understanding of the opportunities that freer trade presents 
Lack of understanding of technological needs in an open market 
Absence of any tradition of seeking advice 
A lack of trust in Government Programs 
Lack of tradition of working together 
Observations in Palestine lead to the conclusion that the above list is generally applicable with one important 
1 See  Mullin Consulting Ltd et al Technology Development, Diffusion and Extension Services in 
Colombia - A  Report to the Department of National Planning of the Government of Colombia, 
sponsored by the Government of Japan, the World Bank and UNDP., November 1996 
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adjustment and one addition. 
Item 3, concerning a chronic lack offunding does not appear to apply in many cases but what does apply is an 
acute distrust of the Banking System by the owners of many SMEs. Many (probably the vast majority, according 
to all of those interviewed) family-owned SMEs will use only their own funds to develop their business 
the additional item relates to the great reluctance of many family-owned businesses to provide training of any 
kind to their employees. In the case of sectors where capital requirements for entry may be low (such as in 
furniture making) it is reported that employers fear that a better trained employee will set up a competing 
enterprise2. In more capital-intensive sectors the fear is that of losing the employee to a competitor. 
As will be discussed more fully later, programs to help SMEs need to overcome the multiple problems contained in 
this listing of characteristics while linking SMEs to sources of help for their various needs. It is from this nexus of 
problems and needs that the requirement for a brokerage function emerges. 
The Palestine National Authority and support for SMEs 
During two long discussions with the Minister of Industry and his senior staff - once arranged by DRC and once during 
interviews for another client, - it became clear that the focus of attention of the Ministry is currently two-fold - 
regulating existing enterprises and attracting new direct foreign investment into a planned series of industrial parks, 
including one designated for high-technology industry. There was little or no interest in the problems of SMEs. 
In part, this needs to be understood against the backdrop of the severe financial constrains being faced by the Palestine 
National Authority which appears to be very heavily dependent on foreign donor finance. All of the significant 
projects of which I heard during my ten days in Palestine had significant donor support. As a consequence, if the 
Minister of Industry was to become convinced that there was a real need to develop support systems to improve the 
technological performance of SMEs, he would have to find a willing donor to finance the activity. 
One added complication in the life of DRC is the suspicion of NGOs which is prevalent among members of the PNA, 
up to and including Chairman Arafat. Pending legislation could require NGOs to be registered by the Ministry of the 
Interior - an assignment of responsibility which is being opposed by NGOs. 
Donor Agency Activity in support of SMEs 
5 .  The European Union and its member countries 
The two principal EU programs directly addressing the technological needs of SMEs in Palestine are the program 
of the Centre for Private Sector Development '(CPED) and the European Information Correspondence Centre 
(managed by DRC) 
CPED was established to undertake sector surveys and individual company diagnostics and then to provide a 
significant subsidy to projects responding to identified needs. It is one of six such bodies in the Middle East and 
2 This observation is recorded in the DRC sector survey for the furniture industry 
The CPED is an EU unit, supported by DG 1 and DG XI11 of the EU, and located in Ramallah 
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was conceived in anticipation of coming freer trade between Europe and the region at large. The CPED in 
Palestine started in 1996 as an eighteen month venture which has been once extended to a projected termination 
date next month! It has had internal problems with Brussels which has allowed CPED only to disburse a limited 
amount of funding, and none for new projects in the last severaI months. CPED worked through local consulting 
houses and NGOs, including DRC which it 'valued highly'. 
The European Information Correspondence Centre (managed by DRC), a member of an extensive network of 270 
such centres in Europe, the states of the former Soviet Union and the Middle East provides access to EU data 
bases on subjects such as availability of technologies or specific equipment and information on firms seeking 
partnerships of all kinds. It is financed by the EU and the services of all EICCs are provided free of charge to 
all users in te EU, in the states of the former Soviet Union and in the Middle East. 
An SME support project supported by the Government of Italy and administered by the ILO. 
There is a project now in operation which describes its objectives as being 
" to provide non-financial support services to artisan and small scale enterprises strengthening particularly the sub-sectorsof 
marbleand stone, leatherand shoes,garmentand textilethrough theestablishment offour Small Enterprises Development Units 
(SEDUs) at the four selected chambers of commerce industry and agriculture (CCIA) in Hebron, Nablus, Bethlehem and Gaza 
and Management Unit (MU) at the Federation of Palestinian Chambers of Commerce Industry and Agriculture (FPCCIA). The 
SEDUs are intended to provide a wide range of highly practical, demand driven services to small-scale enterprises in theselected 
chamber respective area. The type of the services to be provided by the SEDUs include consultancy services to help small 
businessesto overcome a range of common practical problems related to business planning, marketing, productivity and quality, 
highly practical training programmes, facilitation of linkages between small businessesin the same sub-sectors, between such 
group and overseas sectoral associations and between individual local and overseas enterprises, referral services to help SMEs 
identify other support schemes, information services and facilitation of access to credit sources and services." 
Discussion with the Federation of Palestinian Chambers of Commerce, the recipient organization, indicated that 
while the project was having a positive impact in strengthening the four participating chambers of commerce, its 
impact on SMEs was 'difficult to assess' and that there had been no business linkages created between Palestinian 
and Italian firms. 
European Financed Training Activities 
A variety of Europan countries, including the UK, Germany, Italy, Sweden and Holland, all support business- 
related training courses, most of which are delivered with the help of local organizations such as DRC. 
European Donor Coordination 
According to an official, there is no attempt made to coordinate the activities of the EU with those of the member 
countries of the EU in the provision of services to SMEs. 
US AID Programs 
The biggest and newest US AID project relating to business development is a project designed to strengthen the 
operations of Industrial Sectoral Associations - primarily in manufacturing - and to assist in the development of 
a federation of those associations (in parallel to the development of the Federation of Chambers of Commerce 
and its constituent Chambers) 
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No information was gathered on the US AID Small Business Support Program other than a reference to its having 
used DRC Gaza to offer some training courses. The people in the DRC Ramallah office did not know any of the 
details and the interview with the Director of the Gaza office was 
General Donor Coordination 
Donor coordination was described as being no more than informal exchanges of information. 
The limited time allowed for the evaluation did not permit further probing of other donor activities, and in particular 
no information was gathered on a World Bank project dealing with the development of micro-credit. 
Palestinian Organizations providing services to SMEs 
It appears to be fair to say that there are few organizations now operating in Palestine with a capacity to provide help 
to SMEs, that they are not well known to firms and that they face difficulties because individual SMEs do not believe 
that there are sources of potential help in Palestine. (One observer commented that Palestinian SMEs prefer to seek 
foreign help and even then, often do not implement the advice given.) 
Some of the universities identified in the Project Summary (Bir Zeit, A1 Najah and Hebron) as well as the Islamic 
University of Gaza do have capacities to provide testing services and some are seeking accreditation from the fledgling 
Palestinian Standards Organization. In addition two technical colleges - the Palestine Polytechnic Institute in Hebron 
and The Palestinian Technical College in Gaza are attempting to gear their services directly to local enterprise needs. 
The area of skills upgrading is currently being addressed by the Palestine National Authority which in recent days has 
prepared a new Strategy for Vocational Education. The strategy has been approved by the three Ministers involved 
(Higher Education, Education and Training, and Labour) and will now go to the Legislative Assembly. Included in 
the Strategy are provisions for a (potentially controversial) tax to be levied on employers to finance the scheme. 
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The Present Status of DRC 
At the time of the field work for this evaluation, DRC was in considerable financial difficulty due to a conjunction 
of events. As an NGO, it has been dependent on donor support, via contracts, for the funds required to finance its 
operations as well as for funding of the services it delivers. From the information obtained during interviews, it 
appears that DRC depended on three principal sources of income to cover its operating costs, including staff salaries. 
These were: 
1 An annual contract, for about 160,000 Euros from the European Union, for the operation of the Palestinian 
member of the network of "European Information Correspondence Centres" (EICC); 
2 Contract fees from the EU Centre for Private Enterprise Development (CPED) for the conduct of diagnostic 
studies and the provision of advice to individual enterprises (such activities were financed on a 75:25 basis, with 
CPED contributing 75% of the funds and the target firm paying the remaining 25%): and 
3 the IDRC ISU project, now in its third year. 
Additional funds to run specific training courses or to bring specific foreign consultants to Palestine have been 
obtained on an ad hoc basis from a variety of bilateral donors. 
At the present time 
DRC has been without a contract or funding for the EICC operation for about eleven months, despite having been 
evaluated as the most effective EICC in the Middle East. Bureaucratic delays and shifting rules in Brussels have 
meant no contract despite agreement that the work should go on. DRC has continued to provide EICC services 
free of charge to its clients (which is the norm for EICC services in Europe and the Middle East) while having 
no revenue stream to support the activity 
The CPED was instructed by Brussels, almost a year ago, to cease approval of new activities pending decisions 
on the future of the program. At that time it had approved sectoral diagnoses of about 160 firms, and perhaps 
about 20 follow-up firm diagnoses, some of them executed by DRC, but had not yet been permitted by Brussels . 
to use any of its resources for implementation of the results of the diagnoses. CPED's own future is in doubt since 
its mandate expires at the end of August of this year with no decision yet on whether its life will be extended, 
or whether the program and resources will be transferred to another EU-supported body (likely the Palestine 
Development Fund) or whether the program will simply cease to exist. 
the IDRC project is in its final year and is scheduled to provide only limited resources, based on the (unfounded) 
expectation that DRC would by now be generating significant private sector income. 
As a result, total DRC staff is now down to eight (four in Ramallah, three in Gaza and one currently in New York) 
from a high of seventeen. Most of those who received training in company diagnostics in year one of the project have 
now gone. 
The Ramallah office has seen four directors during the lifetime of the IDRC project and one of its current staff 
members is a British consultant in international marketing who spends up to one third of his time in Palestine. 
The current director of the Ramallah office was on home leave in the UK during the period of the field work for this 
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evaluation. 
An attempt was made to collect data on DRC's activities during the life of IDRC support and accordingly, on Saturday 
July 10, copies of three tables were given to staff of the Ramallah Office with the request that they be completed for 
both the Ramallah and Gaza Offices, either separately or jointly. The tables in question were: 
Data on Training Courses 
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Requests for information from EICC (numbers of requests) 
As of the date of writing this report, (July 20 ) no input has been received from DRC. 
A Comment on Project Design 
1999 to data 
In reviewing the project summary, there appear certain features which, to this evaluator, appear to be unrealistically 
optimistic and some that do not appear to be based on experience in technology extension systems in operation around 
the world. 






Regulations in other 
countries 
Search for partners 
Other information 
The primary problems occur in the financing expectations where assumptions are made about the likely revenues to 
be generated from private sector users of DRC services. These problems include: 
1997 
the failure to indicate that among all of the technology extension systems now operating to help SMEs, including 
those in Canada and the US, there is only one case (in one of the German Lander) in which SMEs make any 
contribution to the costs of the initial diagnostic and brokerage services provided by the extension system. As 
it turned out, almost all of the work undertaken by DRC lay in the company or sectoral diagnostic area or in 
attempting to broker linkages between an SME and a supplier of services. 
the failure to discuss how Palestinian SMEs were going to be persuaded to seek and pay for services, particularly 
technological services, without some subsidy. In practice, the SMEs who did become involved with DRC in the 
main came via the European Union's CPED Program which managed to spend funds for some diagnostic 
activities but which was suspended by Brussels before any of its client firms received any support for services 
to assist in tackling specific problems. (Evidence from the highly limited set of interviews suggests that one firm 
has made modest investments of its own hnds  in improving its marketing approach while another rejected the 
technical advice of a DRC consultant [supplied by CPED] and went on to make a significant investment in new 
machinery which was much less expensive than that recommended by the consultant.) 
the failure to discuss the overall financing of DRC which is an NGO. In fact, DRC was almost entirely dependent 
on the three sources indicated in the previous section of this report, viz 
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1 Revenues from the European Union for the operation of the EICC, which have dried up completely over the 
last twelve months due to bureaucratic wrangling in Brussels over the form and content of a new contract 
(while there is no dispute with the desirability of that new contract); 
2 Revenues from diagnostic and brokerage work done under contract to CPED - a source of funds now 
suspended and which could be eliminated as early as August 1999; and 
3 the IDRC project which was providing funding on a sharply declining scale over its three year life. 
Speculation among some DRC staff suggests that DRC is still operational due to the Executive Director using his 
personal resources to bridge the serious gap in financing. 
The Effectiveness and Impact of the ISU's Activities 
Against this backdrop of difficult circumstances, the specific objectives of the IDRC-supported ISU project, and 
the projects expected outputs were reviewed. The results are presented below. 
To allow DRC to set up an office in the West Bank 
to provide SMEs with affordable technical advisory 
and training services; 
Table 1: Commentary on the project's Specific Objectives. 
To assist DRC in establishing an Industrial Support 
Unit in the West bank which will act as a DRC-lead 
consortium of existing institutions providing SMEs 
with technical, management, market and financial 
services in view of enhancing their productivity, 
competitiveness and potential for employment and 
income generation; 
Specific Project Objective 
An office has been established in Ramallah and 
continues to be open, despite severe financial 
problems. The advisory services provided to SMEs 
from this office appear, increasingly, to relate to 
marketing, both domestic and international. 
Observation from Field Work 
There is little evidence that SMEs are prepared to 
pay more than 20 - 25% of the cost of activities 
which then need to be subsidised by a donor agency 
- in most cases the EU's CPED which may now 
disappear in the next few weeks. -. 
The idea of the consortium presented in the project 
was misconceived. It failed to distinguish between 
brokerage and service functions which require two 
different kinds of funding, neither of which are 
readily available in Palestine. 
To promote an integrated and holistic pro-active 
approach to service provision to SMEs in view of 
improving the effectiveness of services provided by 
the Unit's member institutions and enhancing their 
impacts and to substantially increase the number of 
SMEs benefitting from these services; 
The consortium fell apart quite quickly when other 
members discovered that DRC did not have funds 
to finance their activities. The total number of 
SMEs benefiting from the services on offer by DRC 
appears to have fallen far short of the 200 set as a 
target in the Project Summary. DRC has not yet 
provided the data to clarify this point. 
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rable 2: Commentary on the Project's Ex 
Specific Project Objective 
To enhance the access of the Unit's member 
institutions and their client SMEs to international 
information related to new technologies, raw 
materials, export markets, government regulations, 
quality standards, etc .... 
To get a better understanding of the constraints and 
needs of Palestinian SMEs and to provide decision- 
makers with recommendations for the formulation 
of policies and programs in support of the SME 
sector. 
Expected Output 
Observation from Field Work 
The most successful element of DRC's program 
appears to have been its management, through its 
Gaza office, of the EU-funded EICC. According to 
information provided by CPED, it was evaluated as 
the strongest EICC in the Middle East. It has been a 
very significant achievement for DRC to maintain 
this service during the almost twelve months for 
which it has received no budget from the EU for its 
efforts. 
While DRC staff may have developed a better 
understanding of SME constraints and needs , no 
evidence was provided to this Evaluation to suggest 
that this understanding was at any time converted 
into a coherent set of policy recommendations . 
To provide full feasibility studies and 
business plans to new investors and 
manufacturers seeking to upgrade their 
enterprises; 
To develop and implement training 
programs targeting the needs of industry 
on the ground and encouraging non- 
traditional work areas for women: 
:ted Outputs 
Observations from Field Work 
Such work was done in conjunction with CPED. Given the 
lack of DRC data on how many f m s  were assisted, it 
appears that CPED had only financed such activities for 
about twenty f m s  and that this work was shared between 
DRC and a private consulting firm. This would put the 
upper limit on DRC-assisted firms at 19 or less. 
DRC appears to have been active, especially in Gaza, in 
providing both management and technical training ( with the 
technical training said to bemore popular.) There has been 
limited interest in gender questions - DRC Gaza offered one 
course to women on entrepreneurship, described as 'a 
simplified version of a course given to men'. 
To provide technical assistance packages 
to specific SMEs across all major sectors 
requiring help in specific areas of 
manufacturing and technology transfer; 
This has been limited, in most cases, to identifying available 
technical packages via the EICC. In one case identified 
during the evaluation where a consultant obtained from 
CPED was used, the technical advice given to the fm 
involved was faulty ( inadequate consideration to cost 
factors) 
To provide environmental impact 
assessments and promote environmentally 
sound investment and manufacturing 
support; 
No systematic provision of such advice except in cases I 
where EICC services were used to locate a foreign 
technology or piece of equipment in which case$information 
on the environmental performance of the technology or I 
equipment was sought. 
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While the hard reality of the project is that circumstances have conspired to prevent DRC and its ISU having any 
measurable impact on SMEs in Palestine, the organization has developed a positive reputation in the eyes of 
officials and donors for its dedication to the difficult task. 
Expected Output 
A series of sub-sector studies identifying 
constraints, needs and priorities of the 
main SME subsectors in the West Bank: 
A study on the policy, regulatory and 
institutional environment constraining the 
development of SMEs in Palestine; 
A critical assessment of the existing 
research and development (R&D) 
infrastructure and resources for SME 
support and development in Palestine. 
Based on the experience of this pilot 
project, provide recommendations to 
Palestinian policy makers and the donor 
community on alternative mechanisms and 
institutional arrangements for establishing 
a nation-wide industrial outreach system. 
From the limited evidence collected in Ramallah, it appears that the ISU is focussing on assisting SMEs to 
improve their marketing and, in one case of a pharmaceutical company, is engaged in attempting to develop a 
market for the company's veterinary products in a North African country, with remuneration for the activity being 
Observations from Field Work 
A series of studies has been carried out or is in process for 
the sectors of Packaging, Handicrafts, Furniture, Leather 
Goods, Information Technology, Garments, Food and 
Beverages and Pharmaceuticals. These appear to have been 
primarily designed to provide CPED and DRC with 
diagnostic information on individual firms considered 
suitable to receive further support from CPED, delivered via 
DRC. Their utility with respect to sectoral planning or 
analysis is limited due to the almost complete absence of 
aggregate data - a problem in Palestine. 
From reading of two of the reports on sector surveys, it 
appeared that the authors made no use of the kind of 
diagnostic tool available in other countries and which had 
been developed in IDRC projects in South East Asia. Of 
particular relevance would have been the Singapore 
experience in using data collected by the diagnostic tool for 
the purpose of identifying widely occurring problems in 
particular industrial sectow4 
Not undertaken by DRC 
Not undertaken by DRC. DRC staff interviewed appeared to 
have limited knowledge of any technical activities of the 
Palestinian Universities and did not appear to see the 
universities as potential sources of assistance. 
While individual members of DRC staff may offer 
individual pieces of advice to PNA and donor community 
officials, there is no evidence to suggest that DRC ever 
considered itself to be in a position to give overall advice on 
means to establish a national industrial outreach system. 
4 See "Technology Adoption by Small and Medium-sized Enterprises in Singapore" 
SRC Publication No. 1-4603-1-C-92 of May, 1992 
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on a contingency basis - if no market develops, DRC (or Egerton Mercantile, the company owned by an ISU pert- 
time consultant?) will receive no fees. 
No measures exist to demonstrate that, to date, the ISU has had a direct impact on either the productivity or 
competitiveness of any SMEs in Palestine. Neither was the sample of interviews wide enough to identify 'success 
stories' nor did DRC offer any specific cases where an effect could be demonstrated. 
Lessons learned from the Pilot Experiment 
The DRC experience has yet again demonstrated that there is a need for a continuing extension service to 
interact with SMEs to encourage them to change their ways of operation in order to compete against the 
rising forces of competition in increasingly open markets. It has also demonstrated again that SMEs will not 
pay for initial diagnostic and advisory services - at best SMEs will invest in solutions to their problems once 
they have been identified. 
This confirms world-wide experience to the effect that primary extension services - such as initial diagnoses 
of SME performance - need to be finance on a continuing basis by the State. In the case in which the State 
is unable to provide such finance, Donor assistance needs to be put in place with some medium-term 
commitment to continuity. 
Once a basic 'brokerage service' is in place, decisions need to be made on what level of support is to be 
provided to subsidise the cost of services which will be used to meet the needs of the SMEs identified by the 
initial diagnostic help provided. (In Canada, 75% of the IRAP budget is used to make financial contributions 
to firms to help them respond to either needs or opportunities and these funds are additional to other 
government tax incentives or direct contributions to technology development activities. The DRCIISU 
project was operating in an environment in which the only support expected for such activities disappeared 
before ever becoming operational. 
Q Support to NGOs needs to be premised on a full understanding of the financial resources needed and 
available to support the organisation in the long term, and a clear view of the role of each individual source 
in assuring the viability of the NGO. 
P 
Q The cost of providing support to SMEs of the kinds contemplated in the ISU project is significant, even in 
small countries. In places where continuing support from government is not likely, at least in the medium 
term, there needs to be sufficient donor coordination and commitment to make the venture viable. This was 
not the case in Palestine in recent years. 
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A NP~TIBN-WIDE INDUSTMAL O U T ~ A C M  SYSTEM FOR PALESTINE? 
This section of the report will consider experience in other parts of the world which might provide insight into 
how a national industrial outreach system might be designed for Palestine. 
Experience in other countries with technology extension systems5 
Background 
The nineteen nineties have been a period during which much international discussion of economic policy and 
economic relations has been dominated by two words:- 'globalization' and 'competitiveness'. For many 
countries, this heavily private-sector-oriented approach comes fast on the heels of the World Bank and IMF - 
sponsored processes of structural adjustment. Very significant pressures are now being exercised on those 
countries to open markets to foreign competition and to down-size the role of the state as a direct economic actor. 
With today's emphasis on increasing roles for private sector actors, it can be argued that there is both a pressing 
need and a real opportunity for Governments to take a fresh look at the role of S&T programs and policies in their 
countries, to see if they can better align their available resources to the new international context. And all of this 
has occurred in a period which began with OECD Ministers acknowledging technical change as a primary source 
of economic growth. 
The perception that technical change is the primary source of economic growth means that economic and S&T 
policies have to recognize as central concerns the two processes - innovation and technology diffusion - which 
are the agents driving that technical change. 
The rate of technical change in a country depends not only on the amount of R&D done in the country, but also 
on important factors such as the ways in which available resources (including skills) are organized at both the 
national and at the agency or firm level, and on the availability of technologies from both domestic and foreign 
sources. It is within this context that technology diffusion is a highly important concept and so the promotion of 
the effective distribution of available knowledge is a critical function of a "national system of innovation". A 
well-functioning process of technology diffusion can allow countries to make improved progress through 
appropriate combinations of domestic and imported technologies, but this in turn will be highly dependent on 
the 'receptor capacity' of local firms and institutions. 
According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, OECD6 
"Technology df i s ion  is not just a simple one-wayflowfiom emitter to receptor, but has its roots in 
national innovation systems. It is a complex process involving the interaction of a variety of users and 
5 This section of the present document is based on a longer paper on "Technology Extension Systems" presented 
by the author at a Seminar on BEST PRACTICES IN MANAGING POLICY INSTRUMENTS FOR TECHNOLOGY 
EXTENSION INSTITUTIONS held in Santiago, Chile and organized by the Chilean Economic Development 
Agency, CORFO and the Technological Research Corporation, INTEC, October, 1998 
6 See, "Diffusing Technology to Industry: Government Policies and Programmes", OECD/GD(97)60, OECD, Paris, 
1997, page 18 
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organizations, each with drferent roles: suppliers, producers, adopters, non-adopters, thirdparties and 
information networks. Technology can diffise in multiple ways and with signrficant variations, across 
time, over space and between different industries and enterprise types, depending on the particular 
product or process. Technology may be acquiredfiom a variety of sources, includingprivate vendors, 
customers, consultants and other firms, as well as public technology centres, government laboratories 
and universities. Technology also dzfuses through internal "catch-up" efforts offirms, the transfer and 
mobility ofpersonnel, the activities ofprofessional societies, the trade andscientiJic press, varied forms 
of informal knowledge trading andpractices such as reverse engineering. 
Government technology drffusion policies should not seek to create entirely new structures and 
pathways, but to improve the diffision performance of existing national innovation systems. .... Successful 
technology diffusion will address gaps and opportunities in relationships, attitudes, structures and 
practices at multiple levels - the "micro" level of the firm, the "meso" level of networks and the 
"macro" level of broad technology policy. " 
There is now much interest in redefining the role of the state, and of state-supported institutions, in the promotion 
of technology diffusion and acknowledgment of the need to pay particular attention to the complex issues 
surrounding the diffusion of technology among small and medium scale enterprises (SMEs). Governments can 
try a variety of policy instruments in order to promote technology diffusion such as advisory services, technology 
service institutions, financial incentives, grants or loans, or specially-tailored training programs for either firm 
managers or employees . Several governments in various parts of the world are attempting to evaluate how a 
"technology extension system" might be constructed in order to optimize the use of a variety of instruments in 
pursuit of improved diffusion. 
For the purposes of this paper, we will define a technology extension system as 
"a set of functioning institutions, organizations and policies which interact constructively to promote and 
facilitate the diffusion of technology within a national economy in order to improve the competitiveness 
of firms within that economy." 
An additional complicating factor in the design of a "technology" extension system is the need to impart a broad 
view of what "technology" means to a firm. 
"Technology has to do with certain kinds of knowledge which will allow the adaptation and application 
of means to ends. It is embodied in the brains ofpeople, in organizational structures, and in behavioural 
patterns, which in turn are conditioned by the strategies of different social actors and their patterns of 
conflict and co-operation Applied technology is therefore not simply sold or licensed. It is jointly 
embedded by its producer and the user into organizational production patterns and management 
structure. Secondly, technology diffision, and technological change, do not occur in a vacuum. They 
are driven to a large degree by the fundamental requirements of competition7" 
Experiences in dealing with small and medium scale enterprises 
While most governments of the industrialized world have programs to enhance the technological performance 
7 From Mytelka et al, " Canada-Latin America Technology Network: An International Network to Facilitate Strategic 
Partnerships", Report to FOCAL, Ottawa, 1993, p9 
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of their SME's, a common result is that the country's large companies often end up as the primary beneficiaries, 
given their better capacities to act as "technology receptors". For example, a studys of US Federal Laboratories, 
by the US General Accounting Office, showed that the 88 laboratories from 9 major departments and agencies 
surveyed were almost three times as likely to have transfer of technology agreements with large corporations than 
with "small1' ones, while "small" companies (defined in the study as having 500 or fewer employees!) made up 
more than 98% of all US manufacturing enterprises. 
At a meeting (in the mid-nineties) of Heads of National Research Institutions of the industrialized countries, 
most of which have explicit mandates to address the needs of small and medium-sized enterprises, there was a 
growing recognition that 
* medium to large-sized companies with inherent competencies and staying power make better 
clients and partners; and 
* "services" to industry and working for SME's are not enough to maintain a lab's own level of 
expertise. Partnerships with larger f m s  and continuing government support appear to be sine qua 
non conditions for a viable, progressive and effective public research organization. 
While there are considerable successes to be seen in the operations of several industrial extension services, it 
needs to be acknowledged that these services work most efficiently and effectively when their clients have some 
measure of in-house technical competence. In Canada's case, for example, more than 75% of the clients of the 
IRAP system have some in-house R&D capacity, while less than one in three of all Canadian manufacturing 
SMEs fall into that category. A recent studyg in New York State found that SMEs with well-developed internal 
technical skills exhibit above average spending on external help, which suggests that the market for the services 
oftechnology centres improves as the average level of internal technical competence among their potential clients 
increases. A recent World Bank Reportlohas reported on a study of some 167 "Technology Institutions" (TIs) 
designed to serve six industries of differing degrees of technological intensity" in eight different countries of 
different size and state of de~elopment'~ and has produced similar conclusions. This implies strongly that 
developing countries will need to go beyond the experience and practices of industrialized countries as they 
attempt to promote technical change in the vast majority of their enterprises and to strengthen the contribution 
of public or university-based technology centres in that process. 
A typology of diffusion programs and services 
8 US General Accounting Office, "DIFFUSING INNOVATIONS: Implementing the Technology TransferActof 
1986" Doc No. GAOIPEMD-91-23 of May 1991 
9 MacPherson A., The contribution of external service inputs to the product development efforts of 
small manufacturing fims R&D Management, 1997, vol. 27, no. 2, pp. 127-144(18) 
10 World Bank Technical Paper No 383, "Technology Institutions and Policies: Their role in 
developing technological capability in industv" by Melvin Goldman and Henry Ergas, with Eric 
Ralph and Greg Felker, The World Bank, Washington DC, July 1997 
I I The six industrial sectors were foundries, textiles, auto parts, machine tools, software and 
polymers 
12 The countries were India, China, Taiwan, Korea, Japan, Hungary, Mexico and Canada. 
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There are many possible building blocks which can be assembled into a technology extension service. The Table 
below, based on one first published by OECDI3, gives an overview of some of the more frequently found 
elements. 
Typology of Technology Diffusion Programs 
The two important models of "technology extension systems" in operation today are 
Goal 




2 To improve the 
general technology 
receptor -capacity of 
firms 
13 See OECD 1997, op cit, p8; added material is shaded 
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3 Build up the internal 
innovation capacity 
Upgrade the knowledge base of the firm 
a national econo 







Insertion of technically- 
trained staff 
Information networks 





To diffuse a specific technology to a wide number of firms and sectors. 
To promote technology transfer from specific institutions 
To diffuse technology to a specific industrial sector 
To demonstrate the practical implementation of specific technologies 
To provide external assistance to firms in diagnosing technology needs and 
in problem-solving 
To introduce technically-qualified (usually young) people into firms, to 
create a capacity to work on technical change 
Access to information on technology sources, etc 
Build capacity for in-house technology development 
To diffuse (usually a wide-range o f )  technologies within a specific region 
Systematic planning for future strategic technology investments 
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1 the 'brokerage model' in which the system is designed to interact with client firms in order to identify 
problems and then to identify a service capable of responding to that problem - in this model, the extension 
service itself offers advice, and may offer financing, but the main technological inputs come fiom other 
organizations such as technology institutes.; 
2 the 'technology centre model' in which technology centres - usually with specific sectoral and1 or regional 
mandates- actively offer a range of technology services to firms in need. (Even in this model, networking 
and brokerage are becoming important functions.) 
Canada's IRAP program will be used as an example of the 'brokerage model' and the US Manufacturing Extension 
Program as an example of the 'technology centre model'. 
Canada's IRAP Model 
Canada has designed and implemented, over the last thirty years, a technology extension system - IRAPI4- which 
actively seeks out potential clients among small and medium scale enterprises, engages in dialogue with firms to 
identify specific technological needs, and then deploys a series of policy instruments, under direct IRAP control, to 
tackle the problems identified. From its creation, IRAP has been designed to provide national coverage and to deal 
with all sectors of the manufacturing and resource industries. 
IRAP is a field extension advisory service which functions as a network. Its field officers (about 250 in all and 
referred to as 'industrial technology advisers" or ITAs) are regionally located in every province and operate from 
about one hundred and ten cities and towns across Canada. About one third are employees of Provincial Research 
Organizations, and about forty percent are consulting engineers and specialists from universities, colleges, private 
sector technology centres or even industrial associations. (The organizations employing them are reimbursed by the 
national IRAP Program at a negotiated rate per person year, including travel costs plus a fixed rate of overhead to 
cover administrative support) The remainder are employees of the National Research Council of Canada which is 
responsible for program management. The service is provided free of charge to firms , and the specialists provide 
information, guidance and assistance to industry for increasing technological awareness, solving technical problems, 
encouraging the use of new technology and accessing of other government assistance programs. 
An important function of the 1TAs.i~ to initiate contact with potential clients among Canada's small and medium scale 
enterprises since most such firms do not actively seek help. 
The program includes a technical information service which assists small secondary industry to keep abreast of new 
developments in research and technology development and which is operated with the participation of NRC's Canada 
Institute for Scientific and Technical Information. 
Among the policy instruments managed by IRAP and available to the field officers are 
a company diagnostic kit, designed to assist in the rapid appraisal of firm operations, needs and problems; 
a "Technology Acquisition andlnformation Exchange"package of initiatives designed to respond to the need for 
ITA's to support a variety of small scale initiatives. The intention of this element is to enable SME's to 
demonstrate and improve their technical competence as a basis for future, more substantive innovation, 
14 Information on IRAP is available on the World Wide Web at http://www.irap.nrc.ca/irap/irap.html 
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development and technology management. This element is designed to address Canada's shortage of highly 
skilled personnel through training and student assistance projects. Short term technical problem solving is 
supported primarily within the context of a strategy or plan for longer term technological development worked 
out between the SME and the ITA. Financial assistance is currently limited to $15 000 per company with a 
maximum (future) limit of $30 000. 
There are two categories of projects financed within this aspect of IRAP's work - Enterprise Projects involve 
individual firms and proprietary benefits; Industry Projects seek to benefit an industry or sector and strengthen 
industry - wide capacities. There is an implicit attempt to move away from a previous "project by project" 
decision-making approach to one based on a program designed to bring about the progressive development, 
through a series of incremental changes, of a participating SME's technological capacity. 
Research, Development andAdaptation Projects involve financial and technical assistance, on a selective basis, 
for R&D projects up to and including prototype constructions, and for the transfer of existing technologies of 
proven technical merit to SMEs who intend to adapt them to improve their competitive position. The R&D 
emphasis is on advancing unproven technology to the point where it can be moved into performance testing and 
the various validation stages prior to commercialization. 
Many SMEs' most urgent competitive needs involve financial assistance to offset the risks associated with the 
development of entirely new or substantially adapted technologies. This instrument will cover project assistance 
up to $350,000, and will generally be distributed over more than one year. There are distinct levels of project 
assistance available which are linked to delegated decision-making which in turn permits rapid response by ITAs 
to many opportunities. 
an international technology acquisition facility - "The Technology Inflow Program" (TIP) -to facilitate the flow 
of foreign technology into Canada. TIP is designed to assist Canadian companies which cannot fund an extensive 
R&D effort of their own and are unfamiliar with foreign sources of technology. It pays for some of the initial 
costs (up to a maximum of $Can 15,000.00) for seeking out technology collaborations or means of access to 
foreign technology. 
TIP not only facilitates Canadian acquisition of foreign technology; it also helps to establish on-going 
relationships with foreign firms that will result in access to new markets and foreign investment. Such 
relationships can involve various forms of industrial and technological cooperation, including technology 
transfers, licensing agreements, joint ventures, as well as strategic alliances. 
This particular program seeks to help companies access technology in two ways. First, it offers information and 
advice on foreign sources and forms of technology through its specialized advisory services. Second, it provides 
modest financial support to Canadian companies for certain eligible activities such as study visits overseas related 
to the acquisition of foreign technology. 
With assistance from a Canadian Technology Centre - the Saskatchewan Research Council - and IDRC, technology 
extension systems based on the IRAP model have been developed in Malaysia, Thailand and Singapore". 
I S  The relevant publications describing these developments are: 
"Technology Adoption by Small and Medium-sized Enterprises in Malaysia" 
SRC Publication No. 1-4501-2-E-88 of November 1988; 
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The Case of the US Manufacturing Technology Centres 
The NIST Manufacturing Extension Partnership (MEP) is a US nationwide network of locally managed extension 
centers offering technical assistance and the latest business practices to help the nation's smaller manufacturers 
improve their competitiveness. At the heart of MEP is a network of more than 400 manufacturing extension centers 
and field offices located throughout the country. Started in 1989, today's network delivers services to manufacturers 
in all 50 states and Puerto Rico. 
MEP Extension Centers 
MEP centers are local resources serving their local markets. Linked together through NIST's MEP, they are part of 
a national network of manufacturing and business experts. They exist as the result of a partnership among the federal 
government, statellocal governments, and industry to help local manufacturers. They are created through a 
competitive, merit-based process where funding is contingent upon successful annual reviews of each center. MEP 
centers are supported by contributions from public and private organizations that match federal funding. 
While part of a national network, MEP centers are independent, non-profit organizations. They offer products and 
services that meet the specific needs of the region's local manufacturers. Each center works directly with area firms 
to provide expertise and services tailored to their most critical needs, which range from process improvements and 
worker training to business practices and applications of information technology. Solutions are offered through a 
combination of direct assistance from center staff and work with outside consultants. MEP centers are staffed by 
knowledgeable manufacturing engineers and business specialists who typically have years of practical experience 
gained from working on the manufacturing floor, managing plant operations, or both. MEP center staff also know the 
local business community and the available local resources and can access additional resources available through the 
MEP network. As a result, centers help small firms to overcome barriers in locating and obtaining private-sector 
resources. 
MEP centers work with companies that are willing to invest in themselves. That means companies that are willing 
to invest time, money, andlor human resources to improve their businesses. Typical MEP clients include 
manufacturers who: 
have been unable to locate the proper resources or technologies they need; 
want expert, impartial advice in helping them evaluate alternative solutions; 
need help solving a specific problem, such as determining the cause of product defects, modifying plant layout 
to improve work flow, or establishing employee training; 
want assistance in reversing negative business situations--such as sales decreases, loss of market share, or cost 
increases; 
want to implement new technologies or processes that will help establish them as market leaders; or 
seek to improve their ongoing business operations for peak performance. 
Some of the services provided include: 
"Technology Adoption by Small and Medium-sized Enterprises in Thailand" 
SRC Publication No 1-4501-2-C-89, 1989 
"Technology Adoption by Small and Medium-sized Enterprises in Singapore" 
SRC Publication No. 1-4603-1-C-92 of May, 1992 
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O process improvement O human resource development O energy audits 
O quality management systems O environmental studies 
O business management 0 market development O financial planning 
systems 0 materials engineering O CAD/CAM/CAE 
0 plant layout 0 electronic commerce~EDI 
O product development 
How Centers Help 
ASSESSMENTS Many firms begin their relationship with an MEP center through an assessment of the company's 
current operations and opportunities for improvement. As part of that assessment, field engineers may review the 
manufacturing process, the plant layout, the inventory and materials flow, and the policies and procedures. Field 
engineers, also known as manufacturing specialists, then prepare an evaluation of the fm and its operations. These 
findings are reviewed with management and other key personnel at the manufacturing company. 
As a result of the assessment, MEP manufacturing specialists may recommend a few simple, quick solutions or a 
detailed plan of action. Both types of recommendations are designed to provide quantifiable, bottom-line impact on 
performance--productivity, quality, profits, or sales. 
For some firms, these assessments are enough to get started. The manufacturer may have the resources to implement 
the plan, or may incrementally pursue new initiatives or changes. For those manufacturers requiring assistance in 
implementing center-suggested actions, the MEP center can provide the solutions and the support. 
TECHNICAL AND BUSINESS SOLUTIONS The degree and type of assistance provided to each MEP customer 
firm is based on the particular need of that manufacturer. For a firm dealing with employee relations and human 
resource issues, for example, support may come through a management training program, a series of staff workshops, 
or revamping relevant policies and procedures--all services managed by the center staff either independently or 
through other experts. If the field engineers identify inefficiencies in the physical layout of the plant, they may provide 
a number of options for reconfiguration and may guide the process for testing these alternatives. Other services may 
focus on quality improvement, new product development, new equipment needs, marketing and sales support, or 
capital investments. 
ACCESS TO RESOURCES Sometimes, the technical guidance needed by a manufacturer is best found beyond the 
MEP center. That is when the value of MEP is most apparent. Through both its local and national network of partners, 
MEP staff can identify experts and resources from the region--or across the country--that can help improve a 
company's performance. In fact, the MEP network provides small manufacturers with access to over 2,000 partnerships 
with federal agencies, national associations, and other organizations. Projects with the U.S. Department of Labor, U.S. 
Department of Energy, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, U.S. Department of Defense, federal labs, and 
manufacturing associations are examples of how MEP leverages public and private resources to make a comprehensive 
range of technical services and assistance available to small manufacturers. 
SEMINARS AND TRAINING Every day, MEP centers deal with manufacturers who share common problems and 
seek similar assistance. Often, manufacturers may not be aware of available resources. To help manufacturers improve 
their knowledge and capabilities, centers provide a variety of seminars and training programs. These seminars may 
address issues unique to a specific community or information sought by many firms, such as preparing for IS0  9000 
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certification, implementing waste reduction programs, finding and hiring employees, or profiling the newest 
manufacturing technologies. 
In addition, MEP centers help provide manufacturing f m s  with exposure to other manufacturers in the area--and the 
opportunity to share resources and information. Regular events, including tours of local manufacturing facilities, 
discussions, and demonstrations of the latest industry innovations, give company owners and managers the opportunity 
to see state-of-the-art processes and discuss common issues with their peers. 
There are a number of important lessons from the Manufacturing Extension Partnership which can illuminate the 
planning for similar programs being developed in other countries. 
PROGRAM OBJECTIVE. The program must have a clear objective which makes sense to the sponsors, 
service providers, and participating companies. The services for them will depend upon this objective. 
For example, is the program intended to increase the industrialization of agrarian areas? To improve ' 
the quality of life for present manufacturing workers? To increase exports? To begin the manufacture 
of scarce products for home markets? To improve quality, productivity, and competitiveness to achieve 
larger market share? 
The program must focus its resources on activities that achieve the defined objective. Performance of 
each element of the program should be measured against the objective and should be fine tuned. The 
principles of performance measurement from the U.S. program are applicable to the programs of other 
nations, even if the details differ markedly. 
PHASED GROWTH. The growth pattern for the MEP was successfil in allowing experimentation and 
innovative approaches, while at the same time assuring an orderly development of a larger program. 
Faster growth in the beginning bringing with it greater risk, and would probably have reduced learning 
significantly due to a need for caution. The use of pilot projects makes it possible to test ideas on a small 
scale before committing the whole system to them. 
TARGET POPULATION. The program must know which population of companies it is to concentrate on, 
and it must have a very good understanding of their needs and their resources. As the program is 
developed, one of its requirements is continuing to improve its understanding of the target population. 
CLOSENESS TO ITS REGION. Each individual extension centre must be carefilly tuned to the needs, 
resources, and approaches of its region. Cookie-cutter approaches simply do not work. On the other 
hand, if the centre understands the other institutions in its region and works well with them, if it defines 
a service niche which complements rather than competes with others, if it understands that some 
changes in social structure within a company are complex and time-consuming, then it is easy be 
successful 
TOOL ADOPTION. The manufacturing extension system will need tools (manufacturing benchmarking, 
IS0 9000 development, economic analysis, workforce training, solvent substitution, . . . ). Some can 
be adopted with minor adjustments from existing US based tools, and others will require more 
development. 
LEARNINGFROM OTHERS. The MEP borrowed freely and learned valuable lessons from manufacturing 
extension programs which operate at the state level. The program should take advantage of lessons 
learned elsewhere and earlier in the system. 
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MALLEABILITY. As described above, the organizations which make up the MEP have changed in 
structure and substance as they have learned what works best for their target populations of companies. 
This must be taken as a positive sign of strength, and not as a bureaucratic admission of imperfection. 
Continuous improvement makes it possible to serve the companies of the target population now and into 
the future. 
According to one analyst16, "from a base of seven federally-sponsored centres in 1992, the system grew rapidly. At 
the end of 1994, there were MEP centres in 32 states while, by 1997, more than 70 MEP centres existed in all fifty 
statesi7. Regional and national support programs have also been sponsored in such areas as manufacturing extension 
staff training, methods for customer assessment and performance benchmarking, and evaluation" 
The work actually done by the Manufacturing Technology Centres sheds interesting light on the problems 
experienced by the extensive system of US federal laboratories in coming to the aid of SMEs. The US General 
Accounting Office" has published a report which concluded that: 
"emphasised the transfer of acfvanced technologies, such as computer-integrated manufacturing systems, 
@om the National Institute of Standards and Technology and other federal laboratories to small 
manufacturers. Similarly, recent legislative proposals to improve US competitiveness continue to emphasize 
transferring advanced manufacturing technologies from federal laboratories as the primary answer to help 
small manufacturers become more competitive. However, according to officials from professional and 
trade associations representing small manufacturers and the results of key studies on US manufacturing 
competitiveness, such advanced, laboratory-based technologies are not practical for most small 
manufacturers because these technologies generally are expensive, untested and too complex. [Emphasis 
added] According to those sources, the primary technology need of most small companies is to adopt such 
proven technologies as computer-aided design and manufacturing systems to solve routine production 
problems and improve productivi ty... ... .. .. 
NIST's Manufacturing Technology Centres program is the principal federal program offering incentives for 
states to provide technology assistance. Since January 198919, NIST has provided $US 7.5 Million to each 
of three centres located in Cleveland, Ohio: Troy, New York; and Columbia, South Carolina . All three 
centres initially proposed to transfer advanced technologies from federal laboratories to small 
manufacturers. The centres found, however, that their clients primarily needed proven 
technologies. [Emphasis added] During the first thirty months, the three centres initiated 1,336 projects that 
have emphasized proven technologies, while successfully transferring only four federal laboratory-based 
technologies." 
16 See "Manufacturing Extension Services: Performance, Challenges, and Policy Issues" by Philip 
Shapiro. School of Public Policy, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta GA available, in full, on 
the World Wide Web at http://www.cherry.gatech.edu/mod/pubs/mespcp.htm 
17 The group of MEP Centres have created a national association, "The Modernization Forum" , 
which operates an interesting Web site at www.modforum.org 
18 See "Technology Transfer: Federal Efforts to Enhance the Competitiveness of Small Manufacturers" GAO Report 
Number GAOIRCED-92-30 of November 1991 
19 Note that this is from a report written in November 1991 
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It is important to underline that these findings report the views and needs of US SMEs; if they have difficulties in 
assimilating unproven technologies, how much greater are the difficulties of an SME in a developing country? 
More recent workz0 suggests an important bias in the type of demand coming from clients. It suggests that 
" [m]ostfi.equently, assistance is provided in the areas of business systems and management, quality, market 
development, process improvement, and human resources through a combination of initial visits, 
engagements, assessments, and technical assistance projects . The leading categories of MEP service thus 
mostly emphasize "sojIfi" technologies and techniques, only then followed by assistance with process, 
environmental and product technologies. Relatively fewer services are requested in "hard" areas 
technology, such as factoly automation." 
SOME PRINCIPLES FOR THE DESIGN OF A NATIONAL TECHNOLOGY EXTENSION SYSTEM 
Any country wishing to develop a technology extension system to link SMEs to sources of technology and technology 
services should give careful consideration both to the policy environment in which it plans to act and to the principles 
which it will use as a framework for the extension service itself. 
Creating an appropriate policy environment 
* Policy development for technology diffusion in a country needs to be complemented by appropriate policies for 
improving the performance of technology centres or institutes which are designed to be sources of technology 
development and of a wide array of technical services. 
* Any policy for the enhancement of technology diffusion within an economy should pay close attention to the 
likely weakness of demand for technology in many firms. 
Governments should consider special financing programs ( such as the ADTEN Program operated by FINEP in 
Brazil with the help of several loans from IDB2') or tax incentive schemes such as those operated in many 
industrial countries. These schkmes represent means through which governments may share some of the risk 
of technological innovation; in loan schemes, a royalty-based pay-back system can also offer to governments 
the possibility of sharing in some of the returns from successful innovation. 
* In all countries, and especially in developing countries, governments need to pay particular attention to the need 
to stimulate a demand for technical change among those companies which are least motivated towards change - 
in many countries these are the large national companies and the traditional SMEs. Without an effective 
demand for its technological services, no technology centre can become independently financially viable. 
* Ideally, a program for SMEs should ensure that public or private support is available to cover the five needs 
(finance, marketing, management, skills and technology) identified earlier this paper; 
20 See Shapiro, op cit 
2 1 Other such programs have'been launched by FONTEC in Chile and by COLCIENCIAS in Colombia, in both 
instances with help from IDB. 
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* Any policy for technology diffusion needs to take specific steps to encourage linkages between technology 
centres and client firms. This could involve creation of an industrial extension service to perform a brokerage 
role, or provision of specific funding for linkages (which might mean a mixture of loans for firms and grants 
to technology centres) or the creation of 'virtual' centres in key industrial sectors to act as brokers of 
technology services ( as is now being attempted in Colombia); 
Specific Principles 
From consideration of Canada's IRAP program, and the later variations designed in Malaysia, Singapore and 
Thailand, one can derive a set of principles which can be used as the basis for constructing such a technology 
extension system. 
I A National Technology Extension System (NTES) should have clearly specijied objectives and should be 
designed to 
* link enterprises to the different technology services, both public and private, which are available within 
the country, and, if necessary, to foreign sources as well; 
* provide access to both 'hard' (physical) and 'soft' (management and organizational) technologies; and 
* stimulate increased awareness in enterprises of the need to promote technical change in order to become 
competitive in today's global markets. 
11 The clientpopulation at which the extension service is directed needs to be clearly specijled 
111 The direct costs of a technology extension system should befinanced on a continuing basis by the central 
government; 
These direct costs should be deemed to include system management costs, extension officer salaries and 
benefits, travel costs, and overhead costs. 
This is a difficult conclusion to arrive a t ,  since most evidence suggests that organizations which have to earn 
their income in competitive environments tend to operate more efficiently, and with greater attention to client 
needs, than do similar organizations financed by continuing governmental support. However, in no country has 
it been possible to create an effective service in which the costs of the brokering role played by technology 
extension officers have been recovered from client firms. If such initial costs are transferred to firms, few firms 
will make use of the service. However, the provision of any technology service identified by the extension 
service as being needed can be billed to the firm receiving the benefit. These comments even hold true in the 
US where it has been foundz2 that " as apractical matter, it seems that even the most aggressive centres cannot 
cover much more than one-third of their real costs through fee revenue. Indeed, most centres have found that 
the unit cost of marketing and servicing small$rms are high relative to the fees that can be charged, which is 
why the private market for consulting services to smaller$rms is itsevweak. " 
To inject into the extension system some of the feeling of 'uncertainty' which the market provides, its core 
22 Shapiro, op cit 
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operations should be fmanced by a form of performance contract linked to regular performance evaluation. 
It is also important to note that in most successful extension systems, the extension officers can offer to clients 
access to various financial tools to initiate or cany out technology development. In Canada, for example, the 
funds available for such activities are about three times the volume of the funds needed to operate the extension 
system. Within a technology extension system it is therefore prudent to ensure that the total value of the 
financing accessible, via credits or small grants, for technology development is several times larger than the 
cost of running the extension system. 
IV Technology extension officers should be employees of existing technically-qualified institutions, including 
public and private technology centres, universities, or suitably qualified non-government organizations or 
even industrial associations provided that they have appropriate levels of technical capacity plus reasonable 
financial stability (as opposed to being direct employees of the new NTES) 
What should be essential in selecting the organizations to provide extension officers should not be their 
institutional status; rather it should be their commitment to provide an effective service in response to client 
needs. 
Participating organizations should be retained by the NTES via a contract which should normally be of three 
years duration and the contract should contain specific performance targets to be fulfilled during the life of the 
contract (eg numbers of f m s  to be contacted per industrial extension officer per year, numbers of services 
provided to clients) Renewal of contracts should be contingent on satisfactory performance measured agahst 
the agreed-upon targets. The condition with respect to targets is important to ensure that an assured budget 
does not lead to institutional conlplacency. 
The participating organizations should provide a home-base for ITA's which offers on-going connection to 
technology development in the country, as a contribution to keeping the ITA up-to-date. 
V Technology extension officers should be deployed, to the extent feasible, across the principal industrial 
regions of the country involved. 
There is an important need to address the perceptions of inequity implicit in the geographical and institutional 
concentration of R&D funding and activities in any country. 
One means of counteracting some of the effects of isolation felt by enterprises which are not located near 
appropriate technology suppliers would be to offer, via extension officers, access to some funding to defray the 
costs of necessary travel to consult with a technology centre. (In Canada, a scheme exists to defray the costs 
of travel by entrepreneurs to foreign countries in search of needed technology.) In addition, a key element 
of a well-functioning system an the electronic backbone to link all ITAs and participating centres for quick 
access to the identification of appropriate sources of assistance, wherever that assistance might be located. 
VI Technology extension officers need to have both appropriate academic qualifications (usually in a branch 
of engineering) and some useful level of industrial experience. 
It is difficult to overemphasise the need for extension officers to have practical experience in industry prior 
to being appointed to the technology extension service. Their credibility in the eyes of entrepreneurs and, 
hence, their capacity to give help to enterprises, must be based on a proven track-record. This principle can 
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be difficult to adhere to in many countries, given the scarcity of such people. 
VII There should be established a clearly written set of duties for technology extension officers. 
The primary functions of an Industrial Extension Officer should include 
* the establishment of working contacts with enterprises within the sector and geographical area of the 
officer's responsibility; 
* the establishment of close working relationships with all relevant suppliers of technology services to whom 
client enterprises can be referred; 
* the performance of initial diagnoses of enterprise operations in order to identify those problem areas which 
adversely affect productivity and competitiveness; 
* provision of assistance to enterprises in the identification of sources of needed technical services and in 
preparing suitable applications for help, where this is necessary; 
VIII All Industrial Extension officers should receive training in the management of technical change, 
including speciJc training in the techniques of company diagnosis. 
IX The services of industrial extension officers should be provided to enterprises free of charge 
This principle is based on observation of extension systems around the world. Companies simply will not 
pay for the services of extension officers. 
X An initial Pilot Project for the establishment of a National Technology Extension System could be 
implemented within selected sectors of an economy or within a selected region. 
XI One method of managing an overall national extension system would involve creating a national 
coordination group whose terms of reference should be clearly specified 
Such a group would be responsible for 
I) identifying technology-based organizations capable of providing extension services within their sectors 
andlor regions; 
ii) negotiating with those organizations the provision of extension officer services; 
iii) the financing of the extension service, on a continuing basis, via a new budget to be provided solely for 
that purpose; 
iv) monitoring the implementation of the national system by the participating institutions; 
v) strategic planning for the long-term development of the NTES, including consideration of new policy 
instruments to be used within the system; 
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vi) devising affordable programs to assist enterprises to gain access to foreign technologies when no national 
source can be identified. 
Such a national coordinating group should probably not directly manage any extension officers or technological 
services in order to avoid charges of 'conflict-of-interest'. 
Some Preconditions to be satisfied in Palestine 
The international experience indicated above is intended to show some of the complexities of designing a national 
technology extension system as a backdrop for consideration of any involvement of IDRC support in this area in 
future. 
It is the belief of this author that the preconditions for any attempt to move towards the creation of a national 
technology extension system in Palestine include the following: 
1 The real commitment of the Palestine national Authority to focus on understanding the needs of existing small 
enterprises in the short to medium term and to work on integrating financing for such a system into the PNA 
Budget in the longer term; 
2 A commitment by the PNA to implement the National Vocational Strategy which it has designed; 
3 A commitment among major donors to work together to assist in the creation of a Palestinian Technology 
Extension System, operated by a Palestinian institution (which need not necessarily be in the public sector) and 
to provide full financing for the diagnostic and brokerage functions provided by the extension system. 
Furthermore, donors, either collectively or individually, should identify which services , be provided to SMEs 
in the context of the operations of the extension service, they would be prepared to finance or subsidize. 
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SOME OPTIONS FOR HDRC 
In deciding on its future course of action, IDRC must first decide whether it wishes to pursue activities relating to 
the support of SMEs in Palestine within an explicit framework designed to develop a national technology extension 
system or alternatively to consider support to DRC as a continuing experiment. 
If IDRC chooses the first option - that of working towards the development of a Palestinian Technology Extension 
Service, it must engage the Ministry of Industry of the Palestinian National Authority and the Donor Community 
in discussions relating to the design and implementation of a Technology Extension System 
If there is agreement on these issues, IDRC should be prepared to participate in the financing of the system agreed 
to. Since these negotiations would likely be lengthy, IDRC would then need to consider some form of bridge 
financing for DRC, since that body would certainly be a candidate to play some role within a national extension 
system. Bridge financing , if it is contemplated, should be considered under the same conditions as indicated below 
for support to DRC as a continuing experiment. 
For DRC to continue as an experiment in bringing support to SMEs in Palestine, three preconditions would need 
to be fulfilled: 
1 DRC would need to have an assured revenue stream to underwrite its continued existence; 
2 There should be in place a flow of funding sufficiently large to finance the sector study and company diagnostic 
activities of the ISU; and 
3 There should exist some source of funding to subsidize the cost of provision of services to SMEs to attack their 
identified problems. 
4 More training would need to be provided to DRC staff on the use of diagnostic techniques 
In practical terms, this would require 
a) that the EU provide reliable funding to the EICC of a magnitude comparable to what it provided in the past, 
to give DRC a continuing revenue stream to ensure its survival; and 
b) that the European Union provide, in some format, a continuing stream of support equivalent to that provided 
in the past by CPED for diagnostic work and activate a line of support to co-finance actual technical services 
for SMEs 
c) a willingness on the part of IDRC to provide financing to support diagnostic activities on a continuing basis 
and to provide additional training in diagnostic techniques 
d) the definition of a project with fewer and more attainable objectives and more modest expectations of private 
sector willingness to pay for services than was contained in the original project summary and 
e) an abandonment of the general objective of ' improv[ing] the productivity and competitiveness of SMEs in 
Palestine' in favour of a much more modest objective of learning how to encourage technical change in SMEs 
in difficult economic and political environments. 
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APPENDK I: THE INTERVIEWS 
DRC 
Mr Ala'edeen R. Shawa, Executive Director - preliminary discussion held by telephone, July 2 
Interviews in Rarnallah 
Mr Iyad Joudeh, former Director of DRC's Ramallah Office 
Mr Salah Abdel Shafi, Director of DRC's Gaza Office 
Ms Rania El-Khairy, EICC Coordinator, Ramallah Office 
Mr Abid Sabi, Industrial Engineer, Ramallah Office 
Mr Brian A Child, Managing Director, Egerton Mercantile, Eastbourne, U.K., and part-time consultant to DRC 
Palestinian National Authority 
The Hon. Dr Sadi M El Kunnz, Minister of Industry 
Mr Abdul-Malek Al-Jaber, Executive Director, Palestinian Industrial Estate and Free Zone Authority 
The Private Sector 
The Federation of Palestinian Chambers of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture 
Mr Amin Baidoun, Economic Affairs Directorate 
Rabah Plastics Co 
Mr Rajaie Rabah, Owner 
Pharmacare Ltd 
Mr Zudhi Kh. Sawalhi, Assistant General Manager 
Sharawi Confectionary Co Ltd. 
Mr Ahmad A. Sharawi, Managing Director 
Masiri Biscuit and Wafer Company 
Mr Masiri, Owner 
Donor Agencies 
The [European Union] Centre for Private Enterprise Development 
Mr Bany OYConnell, Industrial Development Advisor. 
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APPENDE II: DOCUMENTS C~NSULTED 
9. IDRC Project Summary "Industrial Support Unit, Palestine (96-8601) 
10. DRC, Project Technical Report "First Year of ISU Activity, West Bank, October 1996-October 1997" 
11. DRC, Project Technical Report "Second Year of ISU Activity, West Bank, October 1997-October 1998" 
12. DRC Institutional Profile, 1999 
13. DRC Information Centre Bulletin, Vol2, Issue 3, MayIJune 1998 
14. DRC Information Centre Bulletin, Vol2, Issue 4, JulyIAugust 1998 
15. Untilled, undated and incomplete consultants' report on activities in the Packaging Sector, submitted to DRC 
and to the Centre for Private Enterprise Development of the European Union 
16. Untitled and undated consultant's report on the furniture sector 
17. Massar Associates, "Creation & Management of an Industrial Fund" a briefing note to the Minister of Industry, 
May 29, 1999 
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